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Abstract. Despite the existence of two vast literatures, very little is
known about the potential di¤erences or interactions between search and switch-
ing costs. This paper demonstrates the benets of examining the two frictions
in unison. First, the paper shows how subtle distinctions between the two costs
can provide important di¤erences in their e¤ects upon consumer behaviour and
market prices. In many cases, policymakers may prefer to reduce search costs
rather than switching costs. Second, the paper illustrates a simple methodology
for estimating the magnitude of both costs while demonstrating the potential
bias that can arise from a single-cost approach.
1. Introduction
In many markets, from bank accounts or mortgages to washing powder or computer
software, consumers choices are constrained by di¤erent forms of market friction.
Consumersability to change suppliers is often restricted by both the costs of collecting
information about alternative options and the costs of organising or adjusting to an
actual changeover. Despite this, the two vast literatures on search costs and switching
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costs have remained largely independent of each other1. Indeed, very little is known
about the potential di¤erences or interactions between the costs and worse, the two
frictions are often referred to synonymously. This paper demonstrates the benets
of examining the e¤ects of search and switching costs in unison. It hopes to enable
better policy in two ways. First, the paper shows how subtle distinctions between the
two costs can provide important di¤erences in their e¤ects upon consumer behaviour
and market prices. Second, the paper illustrates a simple methodology for estimating
the magnitude of both costs while demonstrating the potential bias that can arise
from a single-cost approach.
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) suggest a consumer faces a switching cost between
sellers when an investment specic to his current seller must be duplicated for a
new seller. Examples include the costs from lost compatibility, lost loyalty benets
and the cost of rearranging transactions. While search costs may appear consistent
with the last of these examples, it seems natural to make four major distinctions.
Unlike switching costs, search costs cannot be incurred by a fully informed consumer
(Distinction 1), search costs may be incurred more than once by searching across
multiple rms (Distinction 2), search costs may be incurred without then necessarily
choosing to switch suppliers (Distinction 3), and in a dynamic context, search costs
may be incurred before any initial market purchase (Distinction 4). For the purposes
of this paper therefore, the two costs are dened as follows. While these distinctions
and denitions could be viewed as arbitrary, care is later taken to demonstrate the
importance of each distinction on the market equilibrium.
Denition 1. Search costs are the costs incurred by a consumer in identifying a
rms or set of rmsproduct and price o¤erings, regardless of whether the consumer
then buys the product from the searched rm(s) or not.
1For reviews, see Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) on search costs, Klemperer (1995) or Farrell
and Klemperer (2007) on switching costs, and Waterson (2003) for a general overview.
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Denition 2. Switching costs are the costs incurred by a consumer in changing sup-
pliers that do not act to improve the consumers information.
Section 3 introduces the model. Within a standard di¤erentiated products frame-
work (Perlo¤ and Salop 1985), it presents a static game of a mature market where
all consumers must incur both search and switching costs in order to move away
from their existing supplier2. Section 4 starts the analysis by o¤ering an original
characterisation of a consumers optimal search to switchstrategy, describing how
extensively a consumer should search a market and to which rm, if any, the con-
sumer should switch. By then endogenising the equilibrium price, Section 5 provides
a unied model of search and switching costs where the results of standard single-
costmodels, such as Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999), can be
illustrated as special cases.
Section 6 examines the comparative statics. The mechanisms by which the two
costs a¤ect competition have some important di¤erences. Search costs weaken the
incentive for rms to cut prices by reducing the willingness of consumers to start
searching and by decreasing the extensiveness of any search activity across multiple
rms. Switching costs also deter initial search activity but they do not a¤ect the
extensiveness of any search because they cannot be incurred across multiple rms
(Distinction 2). However, because switching costs can still be incurred by fully in-
formed consumers, (Distinction 1), they also enhance the loyalty of consumers that
have searched the entire market. As a result, parameters can be selected such that
either cost can have the larger marginal impact on equilibrium prices. Nevertheless,
the paper shows that in many cases, search costs have the more powerful e¤ect on
market power. This follows from Distinction 3 which ensures that search costs have
the stronger e¤ect in deterring initial search activity. When evaluating whether to
start searching, consumers place less weight on switching costs because, unlike search
2The analysis focuses on Distinctions 1-3. As later discussed, any further dynamic mechanisms
from Distinction 4 are only likely to strengthen the results.
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costs, they are incurred only with the probability of nding an attractive alternative.
Within the context of the model therefore, an authority may often wish to reduce
search costs by improving consumersaccess to information, rather than taking ac-
tions to regulate or ease consumerscosts of switching3.
In line with reality, the model o¤ers an attractive description of market interaction
where some consumers choose not to search, some consumers choose to engage in
costly search and costly switching, and some consumers select to partake in costly
search but then refrain from switching4. Section 7 uses this feature with data from a
consumer survey to recover some quick back of the envelopemeasures for both search
and switching costs within eight di¤erent UK markets. In contrast to the approach
taken by previous empirical studies that provide rich and general structural estimates
of the actual value of either search costs or switching costs5, the paper emphasises
the potential importance of accounting for both frictions. Indeed, it is shown that by
incorrectly attributing all imperfections to only one cost, a single-costmethodology
can exhibit an upward bias.
2. Previous Literature
This section reviews the limited number of previous papers that have analysed both
frictions in unison. Compared to previous theoretical work, our model is substantially
3The paper also notes a result that appears to have been overlooked within the switching cost
literature. Independent of the existence of search costs, the equilibrium price can be independent
of the level of switching costs for certain parameters in the case of duopoly. While recent dynamic
models have stressed the possibility that the incentives generated by switching costs can be pro-
competitive (Doganoglu 2005, Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi 2008 and Cabral 2008), this result stems from
a wholly static analysis.
4For example, 27% (23%) of consumers recently searched (switched) in the UK mobile phone
market (Chang and Waddams 2008).
5Search costs have been estimated from price data alone (Hong and Shum 2006, Moraga-González
and Wildenbeest 2008), from price and quantity data (Hortaçsu and Syverson 2004) and from data
on prices and consumer search behaviour (De los Santos 2008). Shy (2002) estimates switching costs
with a quick method using price and market share data.
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less restrictive. In a model of switching costs, Padilla (1992) allows new consumers
to either have zero or innite search costs, while Sturlusons (2002a) duopoly model
assumes that consumers have either search costs or switching costs, but not both.
Schlesinger and von der Schulenburg (1991) allow consumers to face both costs in
a circular city, but o¤er a counter intuitive equilibrium where, if anything, search
costs have an equivalent e¤ect. Closest to this paper, is the theoretical section of
Knittel (1997). As a foundation for an empirical analysis into the US telephone
industry, he provides an initial description of consumersoptimal behaviour for any
level of search and switching costs. We build on this to o¤er a full characterisation of
consumer behaviour, while endogenising rmspricing decisions. In other empirical
work, Sturluson (2002b) and Giulietti, Waddams Price and Waterson (2005) use
survey data with proxies for each cost to suggest search costs have a smaller or
larger e¤ect on consumer switching behaviour, respectively. Giulietti, Otero and
Waterson (2007) use observations of tari¤ dispersion within the UK electricity market
to make some separate inferences about the trends of search and switching costs over
time. Closest to the empirical part of our paper is Moshkin and Shachar (2002).
Using a di¤erent mechanism to the current paper and not allowing for the possibility
that consumers may face both costs, they develop a model capable of identifying
whether consumerstelevision viewing behaviour is more consistent with the existence
of search or switching costs. They show the former is true for 71% of consumers, and
estimate the average search cost to be relatively larger than the average switching
cost6.
6Specically, they identify the costs by showing that a consumer who is constrained by switching
costs will be equally likely to switch following a reduction in the quality of the current product choice
relative to an equivalent increase in the quality of an alternative product, whereas a reduction in the
quality of the current choice will produce an asymmetrically larger e¤ect in a consumer constrained
by search costs.
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3. Model
The model builds on Perlo¤ and Salops (1985) di¤erentiated products framework
where each consumer places an idiosyncratic match valueon the product of each
rm and where consumers seek to purchase from the rm that best suits her tastes.
Although qualitatively similar results can be demonstrated within a price-search
model, this framework is chosen because it can better capture the full e¤ects of
Distinction 1.
Formally, let there be n  2 rms that each sell a single good with zero production
costs. A unit mass of consumers have a zero outside option and each possess a
unit demand for the market good. Let consumer m gain a utility, umi = "mi   pi;
from choosing to buy from rm i at a price pi; where the match value, "mi; is an
independent draw from a distribution G(") with positive density g(") on ["; "], where
" > ".
Consumers are symmetrically located such that (1=n) consumers are local to
each rm. Due to either physical proximity or some unmodelled previous relationship,
consumers are assumed to face costs of search and switching with regard to all rms
other than their local rm. Specically, if consumerm is local to rm i, she must incur
c  0 to learn the match value and price, f"mj ; pjg; of any non-local rm j 6= i and
then further incur s  0 if she wishes to trade with rm j. However, consumer m is
free to learn the value of f"mi; pig and trade with rm i at zero cost7. Consumers are
free to search any number of non-local rms (sequentially with costless recall) before
deciding to which searched rm, if any, to trade with. A one-shot simultaneous move
game is considered where rms each select a single price, pi; and where consumers
select their optimal search to switchstrategy. Such a strategy must prescribe the
extent to which the market should be searched, if at all, and to which rm, if any,
7 Introducing costly local search does not change the main analysis. The later assumption that
some positive fraction of consumers make a non-local search, bx > maxf"; pg, ensures all consumers
would nd it optimal to make a local search, bx > p .
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the consumer should then switch.
4. Searching to Switch
To begin the analysis, this section derives the optimal search to switch strategy for a
given consumer, under the assumption that the price of the consumers local rm is
pi and that the price of all non-local rms is p: It suggests that the optimal strategy
can be simplied to the use of two reservation utilities: A consumer should begin
search only if her local match value and price compare unfavourably with the local
reservation utility, bx   s; and then stop search and switch only if a discovered non-
local match value exceeds a second, standard reservation utility, bx: Intuitively, this
second reservation utility is equivalent to that found in standard search problems
without switching costs because the decision to further search between non-local
rms is independent of the level of switching costs. If search continues and no such
match value is found at any of the rms, the now fully informed consumer can choose
between the entire set of market o¤ers (net of switching costs). Lemma 1 follows.
Lemma 1. Given a search cost; c; and switching cost, s; the optimal search to switch
strategy consists of the following.
Step 1: If maxf0; "i pig+p  bx s; buy from rm i without search. Otherwise
search any unsearched rm.
Step 2: Keep searching until some rm k is found such that "k  bx. Stop search-
ing and switch to rm k.
Step 3: If no such rm is found amongst all the alternatives, trade with the rm
o¤ering the best o¤er, b, i¤ b > 0; with b = f"i   pi; "j   p   sg 8j 6= i:
Where bx is the unique value of x that solves c = R "x (" x)g(")d"; if bx s 2 ["; "] ;
and bx equals " otherwise.
To derive the optimal strategy, one could formally cast the problem as a dynamic
programming decision with nite options, where any single initial or latter search de-
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cision should be evaluated by its payo¤s conditional on behaving optimally thereafter.
However, as standard search results demonstrate, such problems can be solved equiv-
alently by considering the myopic benets of searching a single rm, disregarding its
e¤ects on future decisions (e.g. Kohn and Shavell 1974).
Step 1 of the optimal strategy provides a rule for deciding whether to initiate
search beyond the local rm. Using the above logic, this reduces to a comparison of
the benets from not searching,maxf0; "i pig, with the expected benets of making a
single search where, for a cost of c, a new surplus o¤er of ("j p s) can be discovered.
Such an o¤er will only improve upon the local o¤er i¤ "j > maxf0; "i   pig+ p + s.
For convenience denote x1  maxf0; "i pig+p+s: The consumer will be indi¤erent
if maxf0; "i   pig =  c +
R "
x1
("j   p   s)g(")d" +
R x1
" maxf0; "i   pgg(")d". Search
will then be optimal whenever x1  maxf0; "i   pig + p + s < bx1; where bx1 is the
unique value of x1 that solves c =
R "
x1
("   x1)g(")d". If no solution exists such thatbx1  s 2 ["; "] then bx1 can be set equal to "+ s without loss as then search will never
be optimal.
After deciding to initiate search and on nding a new o¤er, ("j   p   s); the
consumer must decide when to stop searching in Step 2. If ("j p s)  maxf0; "i 
pig the consumer should clearly continue searching. However, on nding a potentially
attractive o¤er, the benets of terminating search immediately must be compared to
making an additional search, where, for a further cost of c, a further o¤er of ("k p s)
will improve upon the current o¤er only if "k > "j . By denoting x2  "j ; indi¤erence
requires ("j p s) =  c+
R "
x2
("k p s)g(")d"k+
R x2
" ("j p s)g(")d"k: Further
search will be optimal only when x2  "j < bx2; where bx2 is the unique value of x2
that solves c =
R "
x2
("   x2)g(")d". If no solution exists within ["; "], search will not
be optimal and bx2 can be dened equal to " without loss8.
Finally, to complete the derivation, Step 3 follows trivially for the scenario in
which the consumer has searched and initially rejected all the alternatives. Here, the
8As the denitions for bx1 and bx2 coincide, Lemma 1 simply re-labels them both as bx:
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consumer is then free to trade with the rm o¤ering the best market deal (net of
switching costs), provided such a deal is preferred to the outside option of zero.
5. Equilibrium
The paper now considers the rmspricing decisions. For tractability, attention is
focussed on the uniform distribution; G(") = ("   ")=("   ") and g(") = 1=("   "):
From Lemma 1, bx then reduces to (1) if bx  s 2 ["; "] ; and " otherwise.
bx = " p2c("  ") (1)
First, it is clear that the rms are able to sustain the monopoly price9, pm =
maxf"=2; "g; if no consumers wish to search in equilibrium, maxf"; pmg  bx   s:
Consequently, the symmetric equilibrium price, p; is now found under the assump-
tions that i) some positive fraction of consumers do search in equilibrium, bx   s >
maxf"; pg, and ii) s; c  0 such that bx  ": Given that the price of all other rms is
p; and using the terminology of Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2007), rm is resid-
ual demand, Di(pi; p); can be composed into the sum of fresh and return demand,
Di(pi; p
) = Fi(pi; p) +Ri(pi; p); where
Fi(:; :) =
1
n
[1 G(bx  s+ pi   p) +G(bx  s)(1 G(bx+ pi   p)) n 2X
k=0
G(bx)k] (2)
Ri(:; :) =
1
n
[
Z bx
maxf";pig+p pi+s
G(")n 1g(")d"+(n 1)
Z bx
maxf";pg+s
G(")n 2G(" s)g(")d"]
(3)
Firm is fresh demand, (2), originates from consumers who are following Step 1
or Step 2 of the optimal strategy. From Step 1, rm is (1=n) local consumers choose
9The monopoly price follows from the fact that if no consumers search, each rm has a demand
of (1=n) if pi < "; 1 G(pi) if p 2 ["; "]; and 0 if p > ":
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to buy without search if maxf0; "i   pig  bx   s   p and "i   pi > 0: From the
assumption, bx   s > p; the rst condition always ensures the second, and so such
consumers buy with Pr("i > bx s+pi p) = 1 G(bx s+pi p): From Step 2, rm
i receives a demand from non-local consumers who choose to visit during their search
process and nd it optimal to stop and buy. The number of visits can be expressed by
(1=n)[G(bx s)+G(bx s)G(bx)+ ::: G(bx s)G(bx)n 2] = (G(bx s)=n)Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k and
the probability of stopping at rm i, conditional on visiting, equals Pr("i > bx+pi p).
Firm is share of return demand, (3), stems from consumers within Step 3 of the
optimal strategy, who have searched the entire market without nding a match worth
stopping for, but then realise that rm i o¤ers them the best deal. Its derivation is
more complicated and is contained within the appendix.
The symmetric equilibrium price can be found from the rst order condition, p =
 Di(p; p)=D0i(p; p): Each rms equilibrium demand, Di(p; p) can be expressed
by (4), while D0i(p
; p) can be derived by di¤erentiating the sum of (2) and (3), and
evaluating at pi = p in order to obtain (5), where I(p  ") = 1 i¤ p  " and zero
otherwise: An expression for the equilibrium price is then presented in (6)10.
Di(p
; p) = (1=n)

1 G(maxf"; pg)G(maxf"; pg+ s)n 1 (4)
10 In the appendix, equilibrium existence is demonstrated for the case of large n. For smaller
n; we implicitly assume that there no protable deviations away from the price implied by the
rst order condition. Such an assumption is common in models of friction (e.g. Wolinksy 1986,
Grossman and Shapiro 1984) yet Christou and Vettas (2008) show how large upward price deviations
can be protable for a small set of parameters in a related model of advertising. Here, one such
candidate deviation price could be pi  "  bx+ s+ p such that the expression for demand changes
and rm i can only receive return demand. Nevertheless, Christou and Vettas show when a pure-
strategy equilibrium exists, it is unique. Further, in a search model with a (standard) uniform
distribution, similar to ours, Armstrong et al (2007) demonstrate existence for the entire parameter
range. However, due to the addition of switching costs such a proof appears intractable here.
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D0i(p
; p) =
 1
n("  ") [1 +G(bx  s)
n 2X
k=0
G(bx)k   I(p  ")(s=("  "))n 1] (5)
p =
1 G(maxf"; pg)G(maxf"; pg+ s)n 1
("  ") 1[1 +G(bx  s)Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k   I(p  ")(s=("  "))n 1] (6)
The expression for the equilibrium price breaks down into two possible cases, i)
p  " or ii) p > ". In the rst case, labelled as market coverage, all consumers buy
in equilibrium such that each rms demand in equilibrium, (4), collapses to (1=n)
and the equilibrium price, pC ; reduces to (7). Note that as market frictions tend to
zero, such that bx and bx s tend to ", the equilibrium price converges to (" ")=n: This
price corresponds to that found in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) and reects the market
power that derives purely from product di¤erentiation. Consequently, a necessary
condition for the existence of the market coverage case requires ("   ")=n  ": As
formalised in the next section, an increase in friction, decreases bx   s and increases
the equilibrium price. As the price reaches ", either further increases in friction have
no e¤ect on the equilibrium price as pm  maxf"=2; "g = " if "  "=2; or, if " < "=2;
p increases beyond " and the second case of non-market coverage becomes active.
pC =
1
("  ") 1[1 +G(bx  s)Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k   (s=("  "))n 1] (7)
In the case of non-market coverage, the equilibrium price excludes some consumers
such that, in accordance with intuition, the expression for each rms equilibrium
demand, (4), reduces to (1=n)(1   (Pr(" < p) Pr(" < p + s)n 1)): An explicit
expression for the equilibrium price, pNC ; is hard to obtain, but the original expression
for the equilibrium price collapses to (8). Note that as bx   s ! pNC ; such that all
consumers refrain from searching; the equilibrium price converges to pm = "=2:
pNC =
1 G(pNC)G(pNC + s)n 1
("  ") 1[1 +G(bx  s)Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k] (8)
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Finally, before examining the comparative statics in more detail, it is worth con-
sidering some special cases. If one sets switching costs to zero, the price derived in (6)
o¤ers an original unication of the equilibrium prices found in the search models of
Anderson and Renault (1999) and Wolinksy (1986) (which assume market coverage
and non-market coverage, respectively). Second, by setting search costs to zero, such
that bx = "; the model collapses to a static analysis of switching costs which shares
some similar features to the framework used in the innite horizon (duopoly) models
of Doganoglu (2005) and Cabral (2008)11.
6. Comparative Statics
In this section, some comparative statics are examined, while paying particular atten-
tion to the relative mechanisms by which changes in the level of search and switching
costs a¤ect competition. If the monopoly price can already be sustained, increases
in either cost will have no e¤ect. To avoid this case, the assumption that some
consumers search in equilibrium is maintained throughout. Further, as much of the
intuition can be understood in the more tractable and simpler case of market cov-
erage, we focus on that case rst, before discussing the additional e¤ects within the
non-market coverage case. All omitted proofs are contained in the appendix.
6.1. Market Coverage. To aid later understanding, Proposition 1 notes that
increases in the number of competitors reduces the equilibrium price, (7). Intuitively,
increases in n generate two e¤ects on the price sensitivity of each rms demand.
Fresh demand becomes more price sensitive due to a decrease in each rms share of
local consumers (1=n) and an increase in the number of visits from the relatively more
price sensitive non-local consumers. Return demand becomes more price sensitive as
such consumers now have a larger number of options to choose from.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium price is decreasing in the number of rms, n, for
11Doganoglu (2005) assumes uniformly distributed match values, while Cabral (2008) allows for
more general distributions and assumes that rms price discriminate.
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any n  2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > ":
To now examine the comparative statics of either search or switching costs, notice
that in the case of market coverage, one need only examine the e¤ect on the denom-
inator, D0i(p

C ; p

C); as the size of the market in the numerator is left unchanged at
unity by assumption. Consider rst the e¤ects of an increase in search costs, by
writing the derivative of (1=pC) with respect to c as shown below. Proposition 2 then
follows, using the fact that @bx=@c =  ("  ")=("  bx):
d(1=pC)
dc
= ("  ") 1[@G(bx  s)
@c
n 2X
k=0
G(bx)k +G(bx  s)@Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k
@c
] (9)
Proposition 2. The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of search costs, c, for
any n  2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > ":
The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of search costs. Of more interest,
are the mechanisms through which this occurs. Through inspection of (9), one can
observe the existence of two mechanisms that both act to reduce the potential increase
rm is non-local demand that could be generated from a reduction in its price.
First, holding the extensiveness of consumerssearch activity beyond the rst search
constant (via bx), a growth in search costs discourages non-local consumers from
engaging in any initial search activity (via a reduction in bx s). Second, conditional on
a consumer beginning search, an increase in search costs also reduces the extensiveness
of any search via a reduction in bx Now consider an increase in the level of switching
costs by inspection of (10). Proposition 3 then follows as @(bx  s)=@s =  1:
d(1=pC)
ds
= ("  ") 1[@G(bx  s)
@s
n 2X
k=0
G(bx)k   (n  1)(sn 2=("  ")n 1)] (10)
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Proposition 3. The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of switching costs,
s, for any n  2, provided there is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > ":
The equilibrium price is also increasing in the level of switching costs, but the
mechanisms by which this occur have some di¤erences to those observed following
an increase in search costs. First, similar to the case of search costs, holding the
extensiveness of consumers search activity constant, a growth in switching costs
discourages consumers from engaging in any initial search, via a reduction in bx   s.
Second, unlike the case of search costs, an increase in switching costs prompts return
consumers that have already searched the entire market to show an increased loyalty
to their local rm. Note however that, unlike the case of search costs, an increase in
switching costs has no e¤ect on the extensiveness of search as we know the decision
to stop searching is independent of s.
The rest of this section examines the relative e¤ects of the two costs and the
role played by Distinctions 1-3 as listed in the introduction. To do so, it is useful
to dene A = d(1=pC)=dc   d(1=pC)=ds such that search (switching) costs will then
have the larger relative marginal e¤ect if A is negative (positive). As shown below,
A can be rearranged to consist of three expressions. The rst expression is positive
and concerns the impact of switching costs on inducing return consumers to remain
loyal to their local rm. This e¤ect relates to the assumption that switching costs
are still active even when consumers are fully informed (Distinction 1)12. The second
expression is the impact of search costs on reducing the extensiveness of search be-
yond the initial search. This e¤ect is negative and results from the assumption that
search costs can be incurred across multiple suppliers (Distinction 2). Switching costs
produce no such e¤ect. The nal expression is the net impact of search costs relative
to switching costs on deterring initial search activity. Both costs enhance inertia,
12Note that this e¤ect would not be captured within a framework that does not permit the existence
of return demand, as in many price-search models.
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but importantly, note that this expression is negative such that search costs have the
larger e¤ect, with @G(bx  s)=@c  @G(bx  s)=@s =  (bx  ")=("  bx)("  ") < 0: This
di¤erence stems from the assumption that search costs may be incurred without nec-
essarily choosing to switch (Distinction 3). In evaluating the expected benets from
beginning search, the consumer gives a greater weight to search costs as she expects
to incur them with certainty, while only expecting to incur switching costs with the
lesser probability of nding a worthwhile alternative. The inability of consumers to
condition the payment of search costs on the exact value of any non-local o¤er makes
them more powerful in deterring initial search.
A = (" ") 1[(n 1)

sn 2
("  ")n 1

+G(bx s)@Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k
@c
+
n 2X
k=0
G(bx)k(@G(bx  s)
@c
 @G(bx  s)
@s
)]
In aggregate, the comparison of the relative marginal e¤ects therefore comprises
of an evaluation of the e¤ects of switching costs (via Distinction 1), versus the net
e¤ects of search costs (via Distinctions 2 and 3). While it is clear that search costs
always have a larger marginal e¤ect on equilibrium price when the level of switching
costs is su¢ ciently small (as A < 0 for s ! 0), an assessment in the general case
remains di¢ cult. However, Proposition 4 can be stated.
Proposition 4. When the number of rms is small, the marginal e¤ects of the two
costs on the equilibrium price, dpC=dc and dp

C=ds; cannot be consistently ranked in
order of magnitude. However, there exists n such that the marginal e¤ect from an
increase in search costs is always larger when n > n; for all s and c, provided there
is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > "; and if search costs are positive, bx < ":
Far from having equivalent e¤ects, the mechanisms by which search and switching
costs a¤ect the market equilibrium are su¢ ciently di¤erent that the two costs can have
signicantly di¤erent marginal e¤ects on the equilibrium price. When the number of
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rms is small, either cost can have the larger impact. However, when the number of
rms is larger than some threshold, n; search costs have a consistently larger impact
on market power. To understand why, note that from Proposition 1, increases in
the number of competitors reduce the price sensitivity of fresh demand by increasing
its composition towards visiting consumers from rival rms. Consequently, increases
in either friction that deter such visits then have a larger impact on raising prices
when the number of rms is larger. Further note from Proposition 1, that increases
in the number of rms also reduce the price sensitivity of return demand, such that
the loyalty-inducing e¤ects of switching costs on such consumers also decline. Hence,
for su¢ ciently large n; these changes mute the impact of Distinction 1 and allow the
e¤ects of search costs to dominate, through Distinctions 2 and 3. Proposition 4 can
o¤er no general characterisation of the threshold number of rms, but some initial
simulations suggest that n can often be as low as four13.
6.2. Without Market Coverage. In addition to the previous e¤ects, a further
e¤ect of switching costs exists if not all consumers purchase in equilibrium. Indeed,
as switching costs rise, a consumer is less likely to nd a deal worth more than his
outside option of zero and each rms demand in equilibrium shrinks, creating a
downward pressure on the equilibrium price, p =  Di(p; p)=D0i(p; p): Once this
extra mechanism is taken into account, the e¤ects of the two forms of frictions can
be consistently ranked, as suggested in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. In the case of non-market coverage, the e¤ect on price following an
increase in search costs always exceeds the e¤ect on price following an equivalent
increase in switching costs, dpNC=dc > dp

NC=ds; provided there is some search in
equilibrium, bx  s > pNC ; and search costs are positive, bx < ":
13For example, when n = 4; A < 0 for all bx 2 ("; "], and for all levels of " that permit market
coverage, " 2 [("=2); "); for " = 5; 10; 15; 20; 25; 50; 75 or 100. Such results will be dependent upon
the assumed uniform distribution.
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Finally, an extra result is noted that appears to have been overlooked within the
switching cost literature. As a special case when n = 2 and " = 0; the equilibrium
price can be rewritten as p=("2   p2) = 1=("+ bx). Proposition 6 follows.
Proposition 6. In the case of non-market coverage, the equilibrium price is inde-
pendent of the level of switching costs when n = 2 and " = 0; provided there is some
search in equilibrium, bx  s > pNC :
Provided switching costs are low enough such that the monopoly price cannot be
sustained, the equilibrium price is independent of the level of switching costs. This
result is not dependent on the existence of search costs. Instead, it is generated by
the fact that an increase in switching costs reduces the elasticity of demand and the
size of the market in a way that leaves the price unchanged. While recent dynamic
models have stressed the possibility that the existence of switching costs may enhance
competition because the incentive to invest in future market share may be larger
than the incentive to harvestlocked-in consumers (Doganoglu 2005, Dubé et al 2008
and Cabral 2008), this result exists in a static context with no new consumers.
7. Data Application
As discussed in the introduction, previous empirical studies have focussed on provid-
ing rich and general structural estimates of the actual value of either switching costs
or search costs. Instead, this section shows how some restrictions from the consumers
optimal search to switch strategy can be used with consumer survey data to quickly
recover a set of back of the envelopemeasures for both search and switching costs.
The importance of considering both forms of friction simultaneously is demonstrated
by showing how a single-costmethodology can exhibit an upward bias.
To proceed, the results of Lemma 1 are used to select two restrictions on con-
sumers observable search and switching behaviour. These are then solved simul-
taneously to recover the two measures. Specically, for any equilibrium price, for
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any number of rms greater or equal to two, and regardless of the market coverage
assumption, the model suggests the following14. First, the proportion of consumers
who choose not to search beyond their local rm, a, should equal 1 G(x  s). From
before, it follows that increases in either cost deter initial search activity, but search
costs have the larger e¤ect, da=dc > da=ds > 0. Second, the proportion of con-
sumers who choose to search and then switch after only one search, b, should equal,
G(x   s)(1   G(x)). One can observe that increases in switching costs decrease b
by reducing initial search activity, while higher search costs generate an ambiguous
e¤ect by deterring initial search and reducing the extensiveness of any search. Simul-
taneously solving these two restrictions and using the denition bx = " p2c("  ");
o¤ers measures for both costs, scaled by the extent of product di¤erentiation as shown
below in (11).
bc
("  ") =
1
2
(
b
1  a)
2 and
bs
("  ") = a  (
b
1  a) (11)
Had the existence of switching costs been ignored under a single-costapproach,
an estimate of search costs could have been recovered from a restriction on the propor-
tion of non-searchers alone. By setting s = 0, the model would suggest a = 1 G(x)
yielding an estimate, (12). By attributing all the observed inertia to search costs
alone, this method can generate estimates of search costs that exhibit an upward
bias. Indeed, it is easy to show that the single-cost estimate is equal to, or larger
than, that found under the two-cost methodology as bcsingle  bc if b  a(1  a); which
is ensured by bs  0:
bcsingle
("  ") =
1
2
a2 (12)
14The costs can also be identied with a range of alternative restrictions, such as the total propor-
tion of consumers choosing to switch. Though perhaps easier to measure empirically than b, such a
restriction is more complex as it is dependent upon n and the market coverage assumption.
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These measures are now calculated for eight di¤erent markets from the UK, using
responses from the CCP survey as detailed in Chang and Waddams (2008). From
a potential 2027 consumers, those who were household decision makers and aware
of the possibility of choice in the relevant market were asked a series of questions
about their search and switching behaviour. Data on a and b is obtained from two
questions: whether or not the consumer had searched for alternative suppliers in the
past three years and if they had switched in the past three years, how many suppliers
the consumer had searched beforehand. The estimated results are displayed in Table
1.
Table 1: Survey Responses and Estimated Measures of Search and Switching
Costs
Market a b bc=("  ") bs=("  ") bcsingle=("  ")
Electricity 0.69 0.02 0.001 0.641 0.241
Mobile Phone 0.66 0.01 0.000 0.627 0.216
Fixed Phone Line Rental 0.78 0.02 0.003 0.706 0.307
National + Overseas Calls 0.76 0.02 0.002 0.681 0.279
Broadband 0.51 0.02 0.001 0.476 0.129
Car Insurance 0.51 0.01 0.000 0.495 0.129
Mortgage 0.56 0.01 0.000 0.546 0.159
Current Bank Account 0.78 0.01 0.001 0.731 0.304
Several observations can be made. First, and most important, the expected up-
ward bias of the single-cost methodology is conrmed. Had the role of switching costs
been ignored, the estimates of search costs would have been overinated and subse-
quent policy advice would have been misguided. In light of this, attempts to integrate
the role of both forms of friction into future empirical studies would seem desirable.
Second, within the data, the bias from neglecting switching costs is extremely large
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due to the fact that switching costs appear to be very important within the surveyed
markets. Indeed, switching costs are estimated to be large relative to i) search costs
and ii) the range of match values, ("   "): Comparison i) derives from the low pro-
portion of switching consumers that were observed to make only one search. This
indicates that search costs were low such that consumers chose to conduct more ex-
tensive searches before switching. Despite this, the observation that many consumers
refrained from any search activity suggests switching costs were large relative to the
potential benets from improving their match value, which leads to comparison ii).
Finally, it must be stressed that the exact values of these estimates should be
treated with caution due to the simplifying assumptions of the underlying model. It
is hoped that further research can build upon this method of identication in order to
provide a more general estimation procedure in the future. Some specic directions
are suggested below.
8. Conclusions
To help policymakers better understand and measure market frictions, this paper
has o¤ered a unied analysis of search and switching costs. The paper has identied
the mechanisms by which the two costs can generate di¤erent e¤ects on competition.
Largely due to the fact that search costs can be incurred without choosing to switch, it
suggests that in many settings search costs may generate the larger anti-competitive
e¤ect. The paper has also presented a method for identifying the relative magnitude
of the two costs. The method can be readily implemented using survey data and
demonstrates the potential bias that can arise if one accounts only for a single cost.
To provide further help for policy, it would be useful for future research to extend
the papers ndings to allow for asymmetric rms, more general product value distri-
butions and heterogeneous consumers. It would also be of further interest to consider
a dynamic model, although it is likely that this will only strengthen the ndings.
Standard results suggest that the introduction of dynamic competition often erodes
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the impact of switching costs by inducing rms to compete for the future prots of
new consumers that are yet to be locked-in. However, Distinction 4 implies that no
such e¤ect may be present in the context of search costs because it is common for
them to exist both pre- and post-purchase. Search costs are a pervasive, persistent
and powerful impediment to competition. Their study remains a key area for ongoing
research.
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9. Appendix:
Derivation of Return Demand, Equation (3).
The rst term in (3) refers to rm is (1=n) own local consumers. They choose
to search the entire market without choosing to stop but then buy from rm i
with the probability that i) "i  bx   s + pi   p, ii) "j  bx 8j 6= i, iii) "i  
pi  "j   p   s 8j 6= i and iv) "i  pi. As ii) is non-binding, this proba-
bility can be expressed by
R bx s+pi p
maxf";pig G("   pi + p + s)n 1g(")d" or equivalently,R bx
maxf";pig+p pi+sG(")
n 1g(")d": Now consider the second term in (3). A consumer
from rm j 6= i chooses to search the entire market without choosing to stop before
switching to rm i if i) "j  bx s; ii) "k  bx 8k 6= i; j, iii) "i  bx+pi p; iv) "i pi s 
"j   p, v) "i  pi  "k  p 8k 6= i; j and vi) "i  pi+ s: The conditions i) and ii) are
non-binding. Further, by rewriting iv) as "j  "i pi+p s, observe that the proba-
bility that condition iv) is met is zero unless "i  "+pi p+s and so with this further
condition, the total probability can then be expressed by
R bx+pi p
maxfpi+s;"+pi p+sgG("  
pi + p
   s)G("   pi + p)n 2g(")d": Simplifying and multiplying by (n   1) to sum
over all non-local rms gives ((n  1)=n) R bxmaxf";pg+sG(")n 2G("  s)g(")d":
Equilibrium Existence for Large n
For n!1, we now show that there are no possible protable deviations from the
proposed equilibrium price, (6), which tends to (1 G(bx))=[(" ")(1 G(bx)+G(bx s))]:
As n ! 1, return demand vanishes to zero, such that Di(pi; p)=n equals 0 if pi 
p + s+ "  bx, [1 G(bx  s+ pi   p) +G(bx  s)(1 G(bx+ pi   p))=(1 G(bx))] if
pi 2 (p + s + "   bx; p + s + "   bx); [1 + G(bx   s)(1   G(bx + pi   p))=(1   G(bx))]
if pi 2 (p + "  bx; p + s+ "  bx); and [1 +G(bx  s)=(1 G(bx))] if pi  p + "  bx:
Consequently, we need only show i(pi; p) is continuous, and strictly concave in pi
for pi 2 (p + "   bx; p + s + "   bx) as demand is either zero or linear in pi for all
other pi 2 R+: This follows trivially, using D0i(pi; p) < 0 and D00i (pi; p) = 0 for allbx  s 2 ["; "]:
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Proposition 1: The equilibrium price is decreasing in the number of rms, n,
for any n  2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > ":
Proof. Using,
Pn 2
k=0 G(bx)k = (1   G(bx)n 1)=(1   G(bx)); d(1=pC)=dn =  ("  
") 1[(G(x   s)G(x)n 1 lnG(x))=(1   G(x)) + (s=("   "))n 1 ln(s=("   "))] > 0; for
n  2 when bx  " and s < "  " as ensured when bx  s > ":
Proposition 2: The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of search costs,
c, for any n  2; provided there is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > ":
Proof. Expanding (9) yields (" ") 2(@bx=@c)[Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k+G(bx s)Pn 2k=0 kG(bx)k 1],
which given @bx=@c =  ("  ")=("  x); is negative for all n  2 when bx  s > ":
Proposition 3: The equilibrium price is increasing in the level of switching costs,
s, for any n  2, provided there is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > ":
Proof. Expanding (10) yields ("  ") 2(@(bx  s)=@s)[Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k+(n 1)(s=(" 
"))n 2]; which given @(bx  s)=@s =  1; is negative for all n  2 when bx  s > ":
Proposition 4: When the number of rms is small, the marginal e¤ects of the
two costs on the equilibrium price, dpC=dc and dp

C=ds; cannot be consistently ranked
in order of magnitude. However, there exists n such that the marginal e¤ect from
an increase in search costs is always larger when n > n; for all s and c, provided
there is some search in equilibrium, bx  s > "; and if search costs are positive, bx < ":
Proof. To prove the rst claim, we need only show that there exists a range of
parameters with low n where A > 0 such that dpC=dc < dp

C=ds: As A is increasing
in s; set s as large as possible within our assumptions, such that A(s ' bx   ") =
("  ") 2[(n  1)G(bx)n 2  ((bx  ")=("  bx))Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k]. It then follows that A(s 'bx "; n = 2) > 0 when bx belongs to the non-empty interval, ["; ("+")=2): To prove the
second claim, we show that for all relevant parameters, i) @A(s ' bx ")=@n < 0 and ii)
A(s ' bx ") < 0 when n!1: For i) note that @A(s ' bx ")=@n can be expressed as
(" ") 2[G(bx)n 2(1+(n 1) lnG(bx))+((bx ")=(" bx))(G(bx)n 1)=(1 G(bx))ln(G(bx)]:
This is increasing in bx; yet negative for all n  2; even when bx is set equal to the
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maximum value consistent with our assumption that c > 0; that is bx = " . Finally,
for ii) note that A(s ' bx  ") < 0 when n!1 for all bx 2 ("; "]:
Proposition 5: In the case of non-market coverage, the marginal e¤ect on price
following an increase in search costs always exceeds that from an equivalent increase
in switching costs, dpNC=dc > dp

NC=ds; provided there is some search in equilibrium,bx  s > pNC ; and search costs are positive, bx < ":
Proof. Using (8), dene H = pNC("   ") 1[1 + G(bx   s)Pn 2k=0 G(bx)k)]   1 +
G(pNC)G(p

NC + s) = 0: From the implicit function theorem, it then follows that
dpNC=dc > dp

NC=ds if i) dH=dp

NC > 0 and ii) dH=dc < dH=ds: Both are true,
given (@(bx  s)=@c @(bx  s)=@s) =  (bx  ")=("  bx) < 0 and our initial assumption,bx  s > pNC > ":
